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INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1900s, Congress has enacted legislation to deter
discrimination in the workplace and provide remedies for
discrimination victims. 1 All of the antidiscrimination acts prohibit
employers from making employment decisions, such as hiring and
firing, based on certain prohibited characteristics. 2 To succeed with an
employment discrimination claim, plaintiffs must ultimately prove that

* J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.S., cum laude, Dec. 2006, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign.
1
Among such legislation is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)–2000(e)–17 (2006). Likewise,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits employers from
discriminating on the basis of age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006). The Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). A similar, though less well-known, piece of federal
antidiscrimination legislation is the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), which prohibits adverse action based on
association with the military. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4333 (2006).
2
Taran S. Kaler, Comment, Controlling the Cat’s Paw: Circuit Split
Concerning the Level of Control a Biased Subordinate Must Exert over the Formal
Decisionmaker’s Choice to Terminate, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2008).
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they were the victims of intentional discrimination. 3 Yet this decisive
issue begs the question of who must possess the discriminatory intent.
Liability certainly exists when plaintiffs demonstrate that an employer,
as defined by statute, 4 took an adverse employment action because of
discriminatory animus. But because the antidiscrimination statutes also
extend liability to actions taken by an employer’s agent,5 plaintiffs can
also hold employers vicariously liable. 6
In today’s modern workplace, it is quite common to hold
employers responsible for the actions of their agents. Employers are
typically large corporate entities, and the principal employer rarely
personally effectuates employment decisions against plaintiffs so as to
be held directly liable. 7 Instead, the employer’s agent likely made the
discriminatory decision, and the plaintiff is attempting to hold the
principal employer vicariously liable. Agents are commonly
supervisory employees who possess delegated authority to alter the
employment terms of lower-level employees. 8 Thus, employers can be
held liable, whether directly or vicariously, when they or their agents
take an adverse employment action against an employee with a
prohibited discriminatory intent.
However, under the colorfully-named cat’s paw doctrine,
plaintiffs can also succeed when an employee involved in the
decisionmaking process, besides the actual decisionmaker, had
3

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Title VII definition of “employer”); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)
(ADEA definition of “employer”); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)–(B) (ADA definition of
“employer”).
5
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)–(B).
6
See generally Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)
(discussing issue of vicarious liability in the employment discrimination context).
7
Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?:
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495,
495–96 (2001); Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor
Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L.
REV. 1117, 1144 (2008).
8
Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within Grasp of the Cat’s Paw:
Delineating the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal
Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV. 383, 384 (2008).
4
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discriminatory intent. 9 The cat’s paw theory of liability emerged to
account for the fact that employers’ decisionmaking processes have
become more complicated and discriminatory motives can exist at
various levels. 10 Large employers have established a decisionmaking
hierarchy that has many layers of supervisory employees. 11
Employment decisions are rarely made by a single individual; instead,
decisions are made based upon the input of several different people. 12
Higher-level supervisory employees may have to make decisions
about employees that they do not personally know or have never even
met. 13 Consequently, supervisors must rely on information,
recommendations and evaluations provided by subordinate employees
when making personnel decisions. 14
In this context, cat’s paw liability “refers to a situation in which a
biased subordinate, who lacks decisionmaking power, uses the formal
decisionmaker as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a
discriminatory employment action.” 15 Although the cat’s paw doctrine
was first introduced into employment discrimination law in 1990, 16 it
actually derives its name from French poet Jean de La Fontaine’s
seventeenth century fable “The Monkey and the Cat.” 17 As the tale
goes, a monkey convinces an unsuspecting cat to scoop chestnuts from

9

See, e.g., EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 484–
85 (10th Cir. 2006).
10
BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 488.
11
Martin, supra note 7, at 1144.
12
White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 495–96.
13
Sara Eber, Comment, How Much Power Should Be in the Paw?:
Independent Investigations and the Cat’s Paw Doctrine, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141,
142 (2008).
14
Phillip J. Fowler, Employment Cases and the “Cat’s Paw” Theory, 22 JAN.
CBA REC. 44 (2008).
15
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir.
2006).
16
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404–05 (7th Cir. 1990).
17
See BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 484 (citing Gustave Dore, FABLES OF LA
FONTAINE 344 (Walter Thornbury trans., Chartwell Books 1984)).
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a hot fire. 18 The cat agrees and pulls chestnuts out one by one, burning
his paw in the process. 19 At the same time, the monkey eagerly eats all
the chestnuts and leaves none for the cat. 20 In today’s society, the
phrase cat’s paw generally means “one used by another to accomplish
his purpose.” 21
Recently, cat’s paw liability has become an issue of particular
interest in employment law. 22 Since its introduction, nearly all United
States Courts of Appeal have recognized and adopted the cat’s paw
doctrine. 23 However, the circuit courts disagree about how much
control the biased employee must possess over the decisionmaker to
impose liability on the employer. 24 Several circuit courts have adopted
a lenient standard that requires the biased employee to exercise
“influence” over or provide “input” to the decisionmaker. 25 In
contrast, the Fourth Circuit has adopted a stringent rule that the biased
employee must be principally responsible so as to be considered the
actual decisionmaker. 26 The Fourth Circuit refuses to impose liability
even if the biased employee exercised “substantial influence” over the
decisionmaker. 27 Falling between these two extremes, the Tenth
Circuit focuses on whether the biased employee “caused” the adverse

18

Id.
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 354
(2002)).
22
Sean Ratliff, Comment, Independent Investigations: An Inequitable Out for
Employers in Cat’s Paw Cases, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 255, 258 (2009).
23
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th Cir.
2006).
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286
(3d. Cir. 2001) (stating “[u]nder our case law, it is sufficient if those exhibiting
discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decision to terminate”).
26
See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 289 (4th
Cir. 2004) (en banc).
27
Id.
19
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employment action. 28 Yet the Tenth Circuit did not elaborate on what
standard of causation was required. After introducing the cat’s paw
theory, the Seventh Circuit has applied the doctrine inconsistently. At
times, the Seventh Circuit has used a causation based standard, while
in other cases the court has applied a more lenient standard. Most
recently, the Seventh Circuit adopted a “singular influence” standard
that closely aligns with the Fourth Circuit’s strict rule.
In 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
to hear a cat’s paw case and to decide whether an employer can be
held liable for a subordinate’s discriminatory animus when the
ultimate decisionmaker harbored no discriminatory motive. 29 The
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari garnered increased attention to the
circuit split, and the legal community anticipated that the case’s
outcome would profoundly impact the cat’s paw doctrine. 30 However,
less than one week before oral argument was scheduled to be heard,
the Supreme Court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss. 31
Therefore, without guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuit split
regarding cat’s paw liability continues. 32
Part I of this comment will describe the legal background and
origins of the cat’s paw theory of employment discrimination. Part II
will then delve into the current circuit split, examining the varying
approaches used to determine liability. Part III will specifically
examine the Seventh Circuit’s unclear cat’s paw precedent and its
recent shift to a stricter standard. Part IV will argue that the courts
28

BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 487.
BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. EEOC, 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert.
granted, 549 U.S. 1105 (2007).
30
Angelo J. Genova & Francis J. Vernoia, Practical Considerations from
Recent Development in Employment Law: An Analysis of Murphy v. IRS, the “Cat’s
Paw” Doctrine and Comparative Obligations Under the Faragher and Ellerth
Affirmative Defense, PRAC. L. INST., Litigating Employment Discrimination Claims
2007, June 2007, at 9, 20, 22.
31
BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. EEOC, 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert.
dismissed, 549 U.S 1334 (2007).
32
See Ratliff, supra note 22, at 260.
29
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should adopt the motivating factor standard of causation, should more
carefully scrutinize whether an independent investigation breaks the
causal chain, and should apply agency principles as a proper limitation
on liability.

I. CAT’S PAW LIABILITY: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS
A. Fundamentals of Employment Discrimination Law:
Causation and Agency
A critical issue in employment discrimination law involves the
element of causation. The antidiscrimination statutes prohibit
employers from engaging in intentional discrimination, which has
come to be referred to as disparate treatment. 33 Plaintiffs bringing
disparate treatment claims must ultimately prove that the employer
made the adverse employment decision because of a prohibited
characteristic. 34 Yet wide dispute exists regarding the appropriate
standard of causation. 35 Courts, commentators, and legislators have
utilized a variety of “phrases and formulations to describe the
causation requirement in disparate treatment doctrine.” 36 In terms of
statutory language, the antidiscrimination acts require plaintiffs to
prove that the adverse employment action was taken “because of” the
plaintiff’s membership in a protected class. 37 Although the “because
of” language certainly establishes a causation requirement, the phrase
33

Curtis J. Thomas, Note, Cat's in the Cradle: Tenth Circuit Provides Silver
Spoon of Subordinate Bias Liability in EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los
Angeles, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 629, 633 (2008).
34
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).
35
White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 504.
36
Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of
Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 500 (2006) [hereinafter
Katz I]. For example, the Supreme Court used over twenty different formulations to
describe the causation requirement in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Id. at 491.
37
Rachel Santoro, Narrowing the Cat’s Paw: An Argument for a Uniform
Subordinate Bias Liability Standard, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 823, 831 (2009).
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does not inherently dictate what the standard of causation should be. 38
Consequently, uncertainty regarding the causation requirement has
developed and burdened disparate treatment law on a macro level. 39
Nonetheless, two evidentiary methods have developed to assist
plaintiffs in meeting the ultimate burden of proving intentional
discrimination. 40 First, plaintiffs can use the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework. 41 This approach requires plaintiffs to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which consists of four
elements: (1) membership in a protected class, (2) qualification for the
job, (3) an adverse employment decision, and (4) circumstances
indicating that the protected class membership caused the adverse
employment action. 42 If the plaintiff proves these elements, then the
burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action.43 If the employer is able to
offer a legitimate reason, the plaintiff must show that the offered
reason was merely pretext. 44 At this point, the burden of proving

38

Katz I, supra note 36, at 491.
Id. at 493.
40
Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 398. Courts traditionally have utilized the
mixed-motive framework when plaintiffs present direct evidence of discrimination
and used the McDonnell Douglas framework when presented with circumstantial
evidence of discrimination. Id. at 399–400. However, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa has called this dichotomy into question. Id. at 400.
Desert Palace held that plaintiffs are not required to present direct evidence of
discrimination and thus definitely alters the mixed-motive framework. But the circuit
courts have disagreed as to whether Desert Palace changed the McDonnell Douglas
framework as well. Id.
41
Thomas, supra note 33, at 634.
42
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (2000); Dyke v.
O’Neal Steel, Inc., 327 F.3d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 2003).
43
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
44
Id. In this context, pretext “means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some
action . . . [P]retext for discrimination means more than an unusual act; it means
something worse than a business error; ‘pretext’ means deceit used to cover one’s
tracks.” Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
39
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pretext “merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that
[the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” 45
Second, plaintiffs can proceed under the “mixed-motives”
framework. 46 The mixed-motives framework was originally
established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and this method allows
plaintiffs to bring claims when the employer was motivated by both
permissible and forbidden reasons. 47 The Price Waterhouse plurality
concluded that the phrase “because of” did not require “but-for”
causation. 48 Instead, the Court interpreted “because of” to mean that
the decision was motivated, in whole or in part, by the prohibited
characteristic. 49 Therefore, the plaintiff only needed to show that the
prohibited characteristic was a motivating factor in the employer’s
decision. 50 If the plaintiff produces such discriminatory evidence, then
the burden shifts to the employer. Historically, under Price
Waterhouse, the employer could escape liability by demonstrating that
it would have made the same decision even without the discriminatory
bias. 51
In response to the Price Waterhouse decision, Congress enacted
the 1991 Amendments to Title VII. Congress amended the Price
Waterhouse rule that allowed employers to avoid liability with such
proof. 52 Now, employers can use proof that it would have taken the
same action despite discriminatory bias only to limit the remedies
available to the plaintiff. 53 Congress simultaneously codified the rule
45

Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 240 (stating “[t]o construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial
shorthand for ‘but-for’ causation is to misunderstand them”).
49
Id.
50
See U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.
51
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Befort &
Olig, supra note 8, at 399–400.
52
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
53
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
46
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that plaintiffs only needed to show that their protected class played a
“motivating factor” in the employment decision. 54 In sum, the
motivating factor test governs whether the conduct in question
constitutes a violation of Title VII while, as a result, the same action
test controls the type of compensation available to the victim. 55
Notably, Congress enacted the motivating factor and same action
formulations only in relation to Title VII, raising questions as to
whether these formulations applied to the other antidiscrimination
statutes. 56 Just recently, however, the Supreme Court held that the
motivating factor test did not apply to disparate treatment claims
brought pursuant to the ADEA. 57 In a 5-4 decision, a majority of the
Court decided that the ADEA’s “because of” language required
plaintiffs to prove that age was the “but-for” cause of the adverse
employment action. 58 Regrettably, this decision adds further
uncertainty to the already jumbled state of the causation requirement
in disparate treatment law.
In cat’s paw cases, plaintiffs can use either evidentiary
framework. 59 A plaintiff proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas
framework may demonstrate that the employer’s alleged legitimate
reason is actually pretext for a subordinate’s discriminatory motives.60
Alternatively, a plaintiff using the mixed-motives framework must
show that, even though a legitimate reason may have existed for the
decision, the subordinate’s bias played a motivating role in the
employment action. 61 Yet regardless of which evidentiary method is
54

Specifically, Section 107 provides that “an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
55
Katz I, supra note 36, at 492–94.
56
Id. at 492–93.
57
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2349–51 (2009).
58
Id. at 2352.
59
Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 401.
60
Id.
61
Id.
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used, the ultimate question remains “whether the plaintiff was the
victim of intentional discrimination.”62
In addition to the element of causation, another important issue
concerns the scope of vicarious liability under the antidiscrimination
statutes. All of the statutes protect against discrimination committed by
an employer and its agents. 63 The Supreme Court has observed that
the agency language “surely evinces an intent to place some limits on
the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be
held responsible.” 64 Accordingly, an employer cannot be held liable
for every employee’s actions, but only for those employees that can be
considered agents. To determine the proper scope of vicarious liability,
Congress has directed courts to utilize common law agency
principles. 65
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court
followed Congress’ direction when it used agency principles to
consider when an employer can be held vicariously liable for its
supervisors’ actions. 66 The Supreme Court began by referencing the
well-established agency principle that employers are vicariously liable
for the torts committed by employees acting within the scope of their
employment. 67 To be within the scope of employment, the employee’s
action must be motivated, at least in part, by a desire to serve the

62

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). Title VII defines employer as “a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
64
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
65
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 791–792 (1998); see also
Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998).
66
524 U.S. at 754. Specifically, the Court addressed the issue of “whether an
employer has vicarious liability when a supervisor creates a hostile work
environment by making explicit threats to alter a subordinate’s terms or conditions
of employment, based on sex, but does not fulfill the threat.” Id.
67
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755–56 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219(1) (1957)).
63
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employer. 68 Generally, an employee’s discriminatory bias does not
constitute conduct that serves the employer’s business. 69 However, the
Supreme Court recognized that an exception to the scope of
employment rule exists. 70 Specifically, employers are liable when the
employee was “aided in accomplishing” the discriminatory act “by the
existence of the agency relation.” 71 The Supreme Court stated that the
mere existence of the employment relationship was not enough for this
exception to apply; instead, the supervisory employee must be able to
take a tangible employment action against the subordinate. 72 The
Supreme Court defined a tangible employment action as an action that
“constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits.” 73 The employer’s delegation of responsibility to the
supervisory employee warrants vicarious liability. 74 Thus, if the biased
supervisory employee personally makes the decision, the employer
will be vicariously liable for the supervisor’s intentional
discrimination. Such a scenario, however, does not constitute a cat’s
paw case. 75
Unlike the biased employee in a typical vicarious liability case,
the employee in a cat’s paw case does not make the official decision.
68

Id. at 756 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228(1)(c), 230
(1957)).
69
See id. at 757.
70
Id. at 758.
71
Id. at 758 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957)).
72
Id. at 760.
73
Id. at 761. The Court did not define the outer contours of what constitutes a
“tangible employment action.” Id. at 762–63. Some courts have interpreted it to
require a materially adverse action. White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 521. One
commentator has suggested that it should include any action that “a supervisor’s
status as supervisor enables him to take.” Id.
74
Brief of Respondent at 18–19, EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
L.A., 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006) (No. 06–341), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1334
(2007).
75
Eber, supra note 13, at 152.
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Rather, the biased employee uses his ability to make evaluations and
recommendations to trigger the actual decisionmaker to take the
adverse action. In this context, courts impute the biased employee’s
discriminatory intent to the actual decisionmaker, even when the
actual decisionmaker is bias-free. Nonetheless, the agency principles
associated with vicarious liability and Ellerth still serve to limit
liability in cat’s paw cases, and courts often fashion the cat’s paw
doctrine based on these principles. 76
B. Shager v. Upjohn: The Introduction of the Cat’s Paw Doctrine
In 1990, Judge Richard Posner introduced the cat’s paw doctrine
into employment discrimination law. 77 The Seventh Circuit relied on
causation and agency principles to conclude that an employer can be
liable based on a subordinate employee’s discriminatory intent, even
when the actual decisionmaker was admittedly-bias free. 78 In Shager
v. Upjohn Co., fifty-year old Ralph Shager argued that his former
employer, Asgrow, should be liable for the alleged age-based animus
of its manager, John Lehnst. 79 Lehnst was Asgrow’s youngest district
manager, and he supervised Shager and other sales representatives. 80
Soon after starting at the company, Lehnst divided the Wisconsin
territory into two sections and assigned the more difficult section to
Shager. 81 Lehnst later decided to hire a third sales representative for
the Wisconsin territory, even though the territory was not generating
enough business to justify a third position. 82 Lehnst hired Schradel, a
twenty-nine year old, for the position and assigned Schradel to the best
76

Ali Razzaghi, Comment, Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management,
Inc.: “Substantially Influencing” the Fourth Circuit to Change its Standard for
Imputing Employer Liability for the Biases of a Non-Decisionmaker, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1709, 1714 (2005); Eber, supra note 13, at 152–53.
77
Shager v. Upjohn Company, 913 F.2d 398, 404–05 (7th Cir. 1990).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 399.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
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section while Shager retained the worst section. 83 Despite the
difference in sales potential between the two sections, Shager’s total
sales far exceeded Schradel’s total sales. 84 Yet Lehnst inexplicably
gave both sales representatives only marginal reviews and even made
excuses for Schradel’s performance. 85 Lehnst later placed Shager on
probation for alleged problems collecting accounts receivable and
managing salesmen. 86 When the problems continued, Lehnst
recommended to the company’s “Career Path Committee” that Shager
be terminated. 87 In July of 1986, the Career Path Committee fired
Shager. 88
Subsequently, Shager sued his former employer under the
ADEA, 89 alleging that he was terminated because of his age. 90 Shager
presented evidence that Lehnst was biased against older workers. 91
Lehnst was apparently troubled by the age difference between himself
and his subordinates, many of whom were in their fifties. On one
occasion, Lehnst asked a potential employee whether he would mind
being supervised by a younger man. 92 Lehnst also told a younger
employee that “[t]hese older people don’t much like or much care for
us baby boomers, but there isn’t much they can do about it.” 93
Additionally, Lehnst exaggerated the reasons for putting Shager on
probation and later recommending his termination. 94 Likewise, Lehnst
curiously gave Shager a low evaluation, despite Shager’s exceptional

83

Id. at 399–400.
Id. at 400.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006).
90
Shager, 913 F.2d at 400.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 399.
93
Id. at 400.
94
Id.
84
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sales record. 95 And during Shradel’s first evaluation, Lehnst
commented on how “refreshing” it was to work with a “young man.” 96
Based on this evidence, Shager argued that the deficiencies triggering
his termination were merely pretext for Lehnst’s discriminatory
motive. 97
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit considered whether Lehnst’s bias
could be imputed to Asgrow. 98 Asgrow argued that the neutral Career
Path Committee, which apparently did not harbor any animosity
toward older workers, shielded itself from Lehnst’s discrimination. 99
Initially, the Seventh Circuit discussed the common law agency
principle that employers are liable for their supervisory employees’
discriminatory acts taken within their scope of authority. 100 Yet that
principle would hold Asgrow liable only if Lehnst had actually fired
Shager. 101 But, after all, the Career Path Committee made the official
termination decision, not Lehnst. 102
However, the court proceeded to intensely examine the official
decision, and, from this, the cat’s paw theory emerged. The Seventh
Circuit concluded that the innocence of the Career Path Committee
could not protect the company if the committee had acted “as the
conduit of Lehnst’s prejudice—his cat’s paw.”103 The court observed
that Lehnst’s bias and inaccurate portrayal of Shager’s performance
“tainted” and “influenced” the committee’s decision to fire Shager. 104
Indeed, personnel committees often defer to a manager’s judgment
because managers are in a better position to evaluate lower level

95

Id.
Id.
97
Id. at 401.
98
Id. at 404.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 404–05.
101
Id. at 405.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
96
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employees. 105 Given that the committee’s meeting regarding Shager’s
termination was essentially perfunctory, Lehnst’s influence may have
been decisive. 106 As a result, Lehnst would have caused Shager’s
discharge through his evaluations and recommendation. 107 The
Seventh Circuit concluded that Lehnst’s discriminatory action would
be in violation of the ADEA and could be imputed to the company. 108
If the rule were otherwise, “the establishment of corporate committees
authorized to rubber stamp personnel actions would preclude a finding
of willfulness no matter how egregious the actions in question.” 109
C. Cat’s Paw Cases Generally
Since Shager, nearly all of the circuit courts have followed the
Seventh Circuit’s lead and adopted the cat’s paw doctrine. Although
the Supreme Court has never endorsed the doctrine formally, it did
recognize cat’s paw liability in principle in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc. 110 In Reeves, the plaintiff did not present any
evidence that the official decisionmaker was biased. 111 Rather, the
plaintiff showed that his supervisor, who did exhibit age-based
animus, recommended the adverse employment action to the official
decisionmaker. 112 The biased supervisor happened to be the official
decisionmaker’s husband and was described as yielding “absolute
power” within the company. 113 The Supreme Court characterized the
plaintiff’s evidence as showing that the biased supervisor was
effectively the “actual decisionmaker” and was “principally

105

Id.
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 406.
110
See generally 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
111
See id. at 146.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 151–52.
106
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responsible” for the termination decision. 114 As such, even though the
official decisionmaker was bias-free, the Supreme Court upheld the
jury verdict finding the employer liable based on the biased
supervisor’s actions. 115
Although Reeves supports the doctrinal underpinnings of cat’s
paw liability, its factual scenario represents only one type of cat’s paw
case. At the Reeves end of the spectrum, the ultimate decisionmaker
merely acts as a rubber stamp. 116 That is, the biased employee acts as
the de facto decisionmaker, even though an individual “higher in the
organizational hierarchy actually fire[s] the plaintiff.” 117 In this
context, courts can quickly impose liability on the employer based on
the biased employee’s unlawfully motivated actions. 118 Similarly, “if
the ultimate decisionmaker is aware that the recommendation was
improperly motivated, then imposing liability on the employer readily
follows.” 119
But cat’s paw cases differ in regard to the degree of control the
biased employee exercises over the employment decision and,
accordingly, they often become highly fact-intensive. 120 Cat’s paw
cases are more difficult when the ultimate decisionmaker does not
simply rubber stamp the biased employee’s recommendation, yet does
consider it when making the final decision. 121 The employee’s bias
114

Id.
Id. at 152.
116
White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 511–512. The rubber stamp terminology
refers to the situation where the decision maker “gives perfunctory approval for an
adverse employment action explicitly recommended by a biased subordinate.”
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006).
117
White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 511–12.
118
Id. at 512.
119
Id.
120
Loren Gesinsky & Douglas B. Lipsky, When the Subordinate’s Bias
Matters, 237 N.Y.L.J. 10 (May 21, 2007) (noting that the current circuit split may be
explained by the “unique bundle of facts in each case that must be sifted and
weighed in order to determine whether an employer’s complained of action occurred
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination”).
121
White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 512.
115
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may be exhibited in many forms and may taint the ultimate decision in
many ways. 122 For example, the biased subordinate might deprive the
ultimate decisionmaker of accurate data upon which to base its
decision by concealing relevant information or even fabricating
evidence. 123 Or, more simply, the biased employee might put a certain
“spin” on “decision-relevant events.” 124 In determining whether to
impose liability in this context, courts commonly evaluate whether the
official decisionmaker conducted an “independent investigation.”
Essentially, courts look to see whether the final decision was
“sufficiently insulated from” bias, or whether the “taint injected into
the process was removed before the ultimate decision was made.” 125 It
is this context—where the official decisionmaker does not simply
rubber stamp but still considers the biased employee’s
recommendation—that has divided the circuit courts.
II. CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING THE LEVEL OF INFLUENCE
NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH LIABILITY
The circuit courts currently disagree about how much influence
the biased employee must exercise over the decision to hold the
employer liable. 126 Although authorities agree about the circuit split’s
existence, they disagree about where the circuits stand within this
split. 127 The approaches contain slight nuances, which makes it
difficult to place the courts into distinct categories. 128 Not only do

122

Id. at 514–15.
Id. at 515.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Ratliff, supra note 22, at 260.
127
Compare Fowler, supra note 14, at 45 (characterizing the Russell decision
as a “middle of the road approach”), with Eber, supra note 13, at 155 (stating that the
Russell opinion demonstrates the lenient standard).
128
Ratliff, supra note 22, at 260 (noting that “the subtleties of the various
circuits’ opinions on cat’s paw liability often make it difficult to definitively place
them within one category or another”).
123
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inter-circuit subtleties exist, but intra-circuit subtleties exist, too. 129
Adding further confusion, the circuit courts often use imprecise
language within a single opinion. 130 Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit’s
influence standard, the Fourth Circuit’s actual decisionmaker standard
and the Tenth Circuit’s causation standard fairly represent the varying
approaches, and each will be discussed in turn.
A. Many of the Circuit Courts Have Adopted an
“Influence” or “Input” Standard
Many of the circuits impose liability when the biased employee
merely influences the ultimate decision. 131 For example, the Fifth
Circuit requires the plaintiff to prove that the biased employee
“possesse[d] leverage, or exert[ed] influence, over the titular
decisionmaker.” 132 In Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture, the fiftyfour year old plaintiff, Sandra Russell, argued that co-worker Steve
Ciulla’s age-based animus should be imputed to the formal
decisionmaker. 133 Russell and Ciulla worked in equivalent positions at
Homecare, and they reported to the same supervisor, Carol
Jacobsen. 134 Ciulla allegedly made many remarks indicating age-based
bias; in fact, Russell had to buy earplugs for the office because of how
frequently Ciulla referred to her as an “old bitch.” 135 Ciulla eventually
129

See Thomas, supra note 33, at 654 (comparing one Fifth Circuit case
requiring a causal nexus and another Fifth Circuit case focusing on mere influence).
130
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Brewer v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill.,
552 U.S. 825 (2007) (No. 06-1694) (stating that “the various circuit courts have used
ambiguous and inconsistent language to describe the appropriate legal standard”).
131
See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 303 (4th
Cir. 2004) (Michael, J., dissenting) (noting that “[m]ost other circuits, in either
mixed-motive or pretext cases, have held that when the discriminatory bias of a
subordinate influences an employment decision, the employer will be charged with
the subordinate’s bias”).
132
Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (2000).
133
Id. at 222, 227.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 226.
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approached Jacobsen with an “ultimatum” that he would quit if
Jacobsen did not terminate Russell. 136 In addition, Ciulla suggested to
others that he was responsible for Russell’s termination. 137
The Fifth Circuit considered whether Ciulla’s animus could be
attributed to Homecare even though Ciulla did not fire Russell. Instead
of simply looking for bias in the official decisionmaker, the court
assessed whether other employees involved in the decision possessed
bias. 138 The court stated that it will impute an employee’s
discriminatory intent if that employee influenced the official
decisionmaker. 139 In essence, the court refuses to “blindly accept the
titular decisionmaker as the true decisionmaker.” 140
Evaluating Russell’s evidence under this framework, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that Ciulla “wielded sufficiently great ‘informal’
power within Homecare such that he effectively became the
decisionmaker with respect to Russell’s termination.” 141 Ciulla’s father
was the chief executive officer of Homecare’s parent corporation, and
Ciulla allegedly used this power to his advantage. 142 When faced with
Ciulla’s ultimatum, Jacobsen knew that Ciulla’s father controlled her
budget and her job. 143 The court decided that Ciulla’s ultimatum and
age-based remarks influenced Jacobsen’s decision to terminate
Russell. 144
Interestingly, even though the Fifth Circuit focused on mere
influence, the court used terms connoting a higher degree of control at
times. That is, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could
have decided that Ciulla “contributed significantly” to the termination

136

Id. at 224.
Id. at 226.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 227–28.
142
Id. at 228.
143
Id.
144
Id.
137
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decision. 145 Then, relying on the language of Reeves, the court stated
that Ciulla was “principally responsible” for Russell’s termination.146
Regardless of these apparent discrepancies in terminology, however,
courts and commentaries consider the Fifth Circuit’s Russell opinion
as demonstrating the mere influence approach. 147
Other circuits have adopted similar tests but used varying
formulations of the amount of influence required. For example, the
Second Circuit has required that the immediate supervisor possess
“enormous influence” over the decision. 148 Rather than focusing on
the amount of influence, some courts emphasize the biased employee’s
involvement in the decisionmaking process. For instance, the Sixth
Circuit has imposed liability where the biased subordinate “played a
significant role” in the ultimate decisionmaking process.149 And some
courts examine both the ability to influence and the participation in the
decisionmaking process. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit imposes
liability if the biased employee “influenced, affected, or was involved
in the adverse employment decision.” 150
B. The Fourth Circuit’s “Actual Decisionmaker” Standard
The Fourth Circuit has adopted the strictest standard for
establishing liability under the cat’s paw doctrine. 151 In stark contrast
to the influence standard, the Fourth Circuit’s approach requires that
the biased employee “possessed such authority as to be viewed as the
145

Id.
Id.
147
See Eber, supra note 13, at 155–57 (describing the Russell decision as a
model of the lenient standard).
148
Rose v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001).
149
Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 868 (6th Cir. 2003).
150
Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007); see also
Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d. Cir. 2001)
(stating “[u]nder our case law, it is sufficient if those exhibiting discriminatory
animus influenced or participated in the decision to terminate”).
151
See generally Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277
(4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
146
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one principally responsible for the decision or the actual
decisionmaker.” 152 The Fourth Circuit initially set forth this rule in
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc., where fifty-seven
year old Ethel Hill claimed that she was terminated because of her sex
and age. 153 Two of the company’s supervisory managers fired Hill
after she received three reprimands for violations of standard operating
procedures. 154 The managers based their decision on company policy
that provided that three reprimands warranted discharge. 155 Hill did
not dispute the rules violations giving rise to her reprimands nor did
she claim that the two supervisory managers responsible for her
termination acted with discriminatory motives. 156 Instead, Hill
centered her claims on the alleged animus of Fultz, who was the safety
inspector that reported the violations leading to her second and third
reprimands. 157 Hill asserted that Fultz reported Hill’s infractions
because of his discriminatory bias against Hill. 158 According to Hill,
Fultz exhibited his bias by calling Hill a “useless old lady” who
needed to retire, a “troubled old lady” and a “damn woman” on
multiple occasions. 159
Initially, the Fourth Circuit noted that agency principles guided its
determination of who could be considered a decisionmaker. 160 The
court commented that the other circuits that had already considered the
cat’s paw doctrine did not give proper weight to the agency principles
that are meant to limit its application. 161 The court then turned its
attention to the Supreme Court’s decision in Reeves, where the Court
addressed an employer’s liability for the discriminatory motives of a
152

Id. at 291.
Id. at 282.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 282–83.
157
Id. at 283.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 287.
161
Id. at 289–90.
153
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non-decisionmaker employee. 162 The Fourth Circuit interpreted
Reeves to stand for the proposition that the biased employee does not
necessarily have to be the “‘formal decisionmaker’” to hold the
employer liable. 163 But liability will exist only if the biased employee
was “‘principally responsible’” for or the “‘actual decisionmaker’”
behind the employment action. 164 If not, the Fourth Circuit refuses to
impose liability even when the biased employee exercised “substantial
influence” over or played a “significant role” in the decision. 165
Hill, however, argued that Reeves did not define the outer
contours of employer liability. 166 Hill suggested a “substantial
influence” test, which would hold an employer liable when the biased
employee substantially influences a decision taken by the formal
decisionmaker. 167 The Fourth Circuit rejected both propositions. 168
The court reasoned that the antidiscrimination statutes and applicable
Supreme Court precedent did not allow such a broad reach of
employer liability. 169
In dissent, Judge Michael remarked that the majority’s strict
standard “puts [the Fourth Circuit] at odds with virtually every other
circuit” while simultaneously rendering Title VII and the ADEA

162

Id. at 288.
Id.
164
Id. at 288–89.
165
Id. at 291.
166
Id. at 289.
167
Id. The EEOC also supported Hill’s proposed test. Id. The Fourth Circuit
stated that the EEOC asked for an even broader holding under the substantially
influence test. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the EEOC’s argument as
holding an employer liable “whenever the influence is sufficient to be considered a
cause of the employment action, even if the formal decisionmaker did not simply
rubber-stamp the biased subordinate’s recommendation.” Id. (emphasis in original).
For arguments in further support of the substantially influence test, see Tim Davis,
Beyond the Cat’s Paw: An Argument for Adopting a “Substantially Influences”
Standard for Title VII and ADEA Liability, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 247 (2007).
168
Hill, 354 F.3d at 289.
169
Id.
163
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“essentially toothless.” 170 Unlike the majority, Judge Michael would
have adopted Hill’s proposed substantially influence test. 171 Judge
Michael argued that the majority erred by placing excessive emphasis
on agency principles when it should have focused on causation. 172
Causation, unlike agency, is firmly rooted in the statutory language of
Title VII and the ADEA. 173 That is, the statutes’ impose liability on
employers when the adverse employment action was taken “because
of” a prohibited characteristic.174 Judge Michael also criticized the
majority’s analysis of and reliance on Reeves. 175 Judge Michael
concluded that the majority’s actual decisionmaker rule unnecessarily
removes Title VII and the ADEA’s protections from an entire class of
discrimination cases. 176
C. The Tenth Circuit’s Causation Standard
Applying a more centrist approach, the Tenth Circuit imposes
liability when the biased employee’s actions cause the adverse
employment decision. 177 In EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling
Company of Los Angeles, the plaintiff, Stephen Peters, alleged that he
was terminated because of his race. 178 Peters, an African-American,
worked as a merchandiser at BCI’s Albuqeurque, New Mexico facility
where more than sixty percent of the employees were Hispanic. 179 Jeff
Katt, an account manager, and Cesar Grado, a district sales manager,

170

Id. at 299, 301 (Michael, J., dissenting).
Id. at 304.
172
Id. at 301.
173
Id. at 302.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 302–04.
176
Id. at 304.
177
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 487–88 (10th
Cir. 2006).
178
Id. at 478.
179
Id.
171
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supervised Peters. 180 Although Grado handled scheduling,
merchandisers often called in sick to their own account managers,
rather than to Grado. 181 Grado also monitored and evaluated the
employees under his supervision. 182 Grado did not have the authority
to make discipline or termination decisions, but he did have the
discretion to notify the human resources department of any
disciplinary information. 183 The human resources department was
ultimately in charge of disciplinary action. 184
The incident giving rise to Peters’ termination surrounded a busy
weekend where Grado directed Katt to inform Peters that Peters had to
work on Sunday, his day off. 185 Upon notification, Peters told Katt that
he could not work because he had plans. 186 Grado asked the human
resources department whether he could force Peters to work on his day
off. 187 Pat Edgar, a human resources employee, replied that Grado
should tell Peters that working on Sunday was a “direct order” and
failure to comply would amount to insubordination, which constituted
grounds for termination. 188 After Grado relayed this information to
Peters, Peters again replied that he had plans and angrily told Grado
that his plans were “none of [Grado’s] business.” 189 The conservation
ended with Peters saying “[d]o what [you] got to do and I’ll do what I
got to do.” 190 Peters, however, became sick that Saturday, forcing him
to cancel his Sunday plans and seek urgent care health care. 191 Peters
called and informed Katt that he could not work that Sunday because
180

Id.
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 479.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 480.
181
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of his illness. 192 After Peters failed to work on Sunday, Edgar spoke
with other human resources personnel, as well as Grado. 193 Edgar
decided to terminate Peters. 194 Edgar claimed her primary reason for
terminating Peters was his behavior toward Grado, not for failing to
work. 195
Thereafter, Peters filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the EEOC filed suit on his
behalf, alleging that his termination was due to racial
discrimination. 196 The EEOC argued that even though Edgar was the
sole decisionmaker and was unaware that Peters was black, “Grado
harbored racial animus toward African American employees and . . .
this bias [should be] imputed to BCI because of Grado’s substantial
involvement in the termination process as Peters’ supervisor and
Edgar’s sole source of information about the events on which BCI
alleges the termination was primarily based.” 197 The EEOC presented
affidavits from other BCI employees stating that Grado treated
African-American employees worse than employees of other races. 198
Grado also allegedly made race-based remarks at the workplace. 199
Additionally, the EEOC compared Grado’s treatment of Peters to
his treatment of a Hispanic employee in a similar situation.200 During
a different busy weekend, Grado told Katt to direct Monica Lovato, a
Hispanic merchandiser, to work her day off. 201 Lovato replied that she
would be celebrating her birthday on those days but Katt insisted that
she was required to work. 202 Lovato failed to show up to work, even
192

Id.
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 482.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
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after being paged repeatedly. 203 Yet Grado never inquired about
Lovato’s reasons for missing work, and instead, Grado stated “you
can’t make somebody work one of their days off.” 204 The human
resources department never disciplined Lovato for this incident. 205
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether Grado’s alleged
racial bias could be imputed to BCI under the cat’s paw theory of
liability. 206 The Tenth Circuit noted that the circuits disagreed about
the level of control that a biased employee must exert over the
decision to warrant liability. 207 The court described a “lenient”
approach that holds employers liable so long as the biased employee
exercised any level of influence. 208 The Tenth Circuit concluded that
the lenient approach was inconsistent with agency principles,
improperly eliminated the element of causation, and weakened the
deterrent effect of cat’s paw liability. 209 Thus, the court decided that
plaintiffs must prove more than mere influence over the
decisionmaking process. 210
Turning to the opposite end of the spectrum, the Tenth Circuit also
disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s strict standard because it
misconstrued the Supreme Court’s holding in Reeves. 211 The court
reasoned that the Reeves Court did not intend for the phrase “actual
decisionmaker” to prescribe the outer contours of liability, but, rather,
the Supreme Court used the phrase to describe the employee’s
evidence. 212 In essence, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Fourth

203

Id.
Id. at 482–83.
205
Id. at 483.
206
Id. at 484.
207
Id. at 486.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 486–87.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
204
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Circuit took the cat’s paw metaphor “too literally in deriving its totalcontrol-over-the-decision standard.” 213
The court held that plaintiffs must prove that “the biased
subordinate’s discriminatory reports, recommendation, or other actions
caused the adverse employment action.” 214 Not only does this rule
comply with agency principles, the court reasoned, but courts require a
comparable causation standard in analogous workplace discrimination
claims. 215 Although the Tenth Circuit clearly adopted a causationbased approach, the court never explicitly defined “cause,” nor did it
state what type of causation was required. The court’s omission raises
serious doctrinal concerns because several different standards of
causation exist.
However, the Tenth Circuit did specify that the official
decisionmaker can break the causal connection by conducting an
independent investigation into the allegations against the employee. 216
In fact, the court stated that simply asking the affected employees for
their version of the events would constitute an independent
investigation. 217 But in the case at bar, Edgar’s cursory review of
Peter’s personnel file did not amount to an independent
investigation. 218 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the EEOC presented
sufficient evidence that Grado’s biased account of his conversation
with Peters caused Peter’s termination. 219

213

Id. at 488.
Id.
215
Id. at 487–88. Notably, the Tenth Circuit held that the cat’s paw doctrine
did not require an explicit recommendation from the biased subordinate to fire the
plaintiff. Id. at 488.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 492.
219
Id. at 491.
214
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III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT: WHERE DOES IT STAND?
The Seventh Circuit has been pegged with the introduction of the
cat’s paw doctrine, and yet it has inconsistently applied the doctrine.
The court has even admitted its ambiguous ways, stating “our
approach to Title VII cases involving an employee’s influence over a
decision maker has not always been completely clear.” 220 The Seventh
Circuit’s first cat’s paw case, Shager, characterized the subordinate’s
influence as “decisive” and evaluated the “causal link” between the
subordinate’s bias and Shager’s discharge. 221 Since Shager, the
Seventh Circuit has used various standards in cat’s paw cases. At times
the court has applied a more lenient standard, but recently the court
has required a much higher level of control. 222 In fact, the Seventh
Circuit stated in 2007 that “[o]ur opinions have sometimes suggested
that not only significant influence, but any influence over an
employment decision is sufficient to impose Title VII liability on an
employer.” 223
For example, in Dey v. Colt Construction and Development
Company, the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs can defeat summary
judgment by showing that “an employee with discriminatory animus
provided factual information or other input that may have affected the
adverse employment action.” 224 The plaintiff, Dey, filed suit arguing
that she was terminated in retaliation for her sexual harassment
complaints against the company’s vice president and general counsel,
220

Brewer v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 2007).
913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
222
Compare Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1994),
with Brewer, 479 F.3d 908.
223
Brewer, 479 F.3d at 919.
224
28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics,
Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1400 (7th Cir. 1997) (the court stated that “the prejudices of an
employee, normally a subordinate but here a coequal, are imputed to the employee
who has formal authority over the plaintiff’s job . . . where the subordinate, by
concealing relevant information from the decisionmaking employee or feeding false
information to him, is able to influence the decision”); Hoffman v. MCA, Inc., 144
F.3d 1117, 1121–22 (7th Cir. 1998) (“tainted the decision maker’s judgment”).
221
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Chernoff. 225 However, the official decisionmaker, Isray, was unaware
of Dey’s complaints. 226 Accordingly, the company claimed that no
causal link existed between Dey’s protected activity and her
termination. 227 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the
official decisionmaker was unaware of Dey’s protected activity, but
further observed that Chernoff participated in the meeting discussing
Dey’s termination. 228 During the meeting, Isray had asked Chernoff
about Dey’s performance. 229 Chernoff replied that her performance
was unsatisfactory and that he believed she should be terminated. 230
From this, the court concluded that, even if Isray was unaware of the
complaints, “those complaints may have affected Chernoff's
unflattering assessment of her job performance” and “Chernoff's
participation may have introduced a discriminatory animus into Isray's
decision.” 231
In Lust v. Sealy, Inc., the Seventh Circuit explicitly renounced the
Fourth Circuit’s actual decisionmaker standard and stated that the
strict rule was not in line with the Seventh Circuit’s view. 232 The
Seventh Circuit explained that courts should not interpret the cat’s paw
formula too literally. 233 In fact, if the cat’s paw analogy was “taken
even semi-literally it would be inconsistent with the normal analysis of
causal issues in tort litigation.” 234
Yet in 2007, just a few years later, the Seventh Circuit arguably
aligned itself with the Fourth Circuit’s stringent standard. The Seventh
Circuit held that liability should exist only when the biased employee

225

Dey, 28 F.3d at 1450.
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id. at 1459.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 1459–1460.
232
383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004).
233
Id.
234
Id.
226
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exercises “singular influence” over the official decisionmaker. 235 In
Brewer, Lonnell Brewer, an African-American, brought a Title VII
action against the University of Illinois alleging that he was terminated
from his job and dismissed from his master’s program because of his
race. 236 Brewer invoked the cat’s paw theory to impute the
discriminatory bias of his supervisor, Kerrin Thompson, to the
University. 237
The events leading to Brewer’s termination involved a scandal
regarding his parking pass. 238 When Brewer began his assistantship,
Thompson told him that he could park anywhere. 239 After receiving a
ticket for a broken pass, Brewer went to the university’s parking
services to get a replacement parking sticker. 240 Parking services
noticed that Brewer’s parking application contained inaccurate
information. 241 Brewer went to speak with Thompson about the issue,
and Thompson became “irate,” telling Brewer he should have never
gone to the parking services office because Thompson had lied in the
application to be able to get Brewer the parking tag. 242 After Brewer
reminded Thompson that she told him he could park anywhere, she
furiously stated that she was “through with you people.” 243 And as
Brewer left her office, Thompson yelled out “I have had it with you
nigger, get my tag!” 244 The program director, Denise Hendricks,
terminated Brewer because of the parking incident. 245 Brewer argued
235

See Brewer, 479 F.3d at 917–18.
Id. at 909.
237
Id. at 916–17.
238
Id. at 909. Judge Cudahy interestingly introduced the case by stating that it
“concerns the corrupt, Machiavellian world of permit parking at the University of
Illinois’s Urbana-Champaign campus, and the ill fortune of a student who became
involved in it.” Id.
239
Id. at 910.
240
Id. at 913.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id.
236
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that racial bias motivated Thompson’s failure to tell Hendricks that she
had given Brewer permission to park anywhere, and Brewer contended
that this omission caused his termination. 246
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit analyzed whether the University
could be liable for Thompson’s racially motivated omission. 247 The
court stated that what other employees say to each other typically does
not constitute an adverse employment action. 248 However, in certain
contexts, such as a performance review, what one employee says or
does not say about another can control an employee’s wages, affect
chances of promotion or even trigger termination. 249 The court
decided that Thompson’s withholding of information influenced
Hendricks’s decision to fire Brewer. 250
But an employee’s minimal amount of influence does not warrant
liability; rather, the biased employee must exercise singular
influence. 251 The Seventh Circuit explained that the biased employee
must “possess so much influence as to basically be herself the true
‘functional[ ] . . . decision-maker.’” 252 Focusing on the analogy
underlying the doctrine, the court stated that the functional
decisionmaker must be nothing more than the biased employee’s cat’s
paw. 253 The court described such a situation as one where the
functional decisionmaker entirely depends on another employee to
“supply the information on which to base that decision.” 254 Liability
will not exist as long as the decisionmaker does not rely solely on the
biased employee’s information, even if she heavily relies on it. 255
246

Id. at 916.
Id.
248
Id. at 917.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id. (quoting Little v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir.
2004)).
253
Id. at 917–18.
254
Id. at 918.
255
Id. at 919.
247
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Similarly, the court held that an employer can prevent liability by
conducting an investigation into the facts relevant to the decision. 256
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Hendricks looked into the
situation herself and did not entirely rely on the information that
Thompson told her. 257 Notably, the court stated that when faced with
two conflicting stories, an employer satisfies the independent
investigation defense by simply considering both stories. 258 The court
also suggested Brewer had a duty to tell Hendricks that Thompson was
withholding information to trigger further investigation.259
The Seventh Circuit then turned to address the conflict between
the singular influence approach and its prior precedent. 260 To the
extent that previous cases had suggested that any influence establishes
liability, the court stated those cases were doubtful dicta and simply
involved “imprecise language.” 261 Further, the court compared those
cases with numerous others where the court upheld summary
judgment when a biased employee may have exercised potential, but
slight, influence over the decision. 262
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its singular
influence standard in an employment discrimination case arising under
the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights
Act. 263 In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the plaintiff, Vincent Staub,
alleged that he was terminated because of his military association and
the reasons given for his termination—insubordination, shirking, and
attitude problems—were merely pretext. 264 As an Army reservist,
Staub had military obligations one weekend per month and two weeks
256

Id. at 918.
Id. at 919.
258
Id. at 918.
259
Id. at 919.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id. at 919–20.
263
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2009); 38 U.S.C.
§§ 4301–4333 (2006).
264
Staub, 560 F.3d at 650–51.
257
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in the summer. 265 Janice Mulally, Staub’s supervisor in charge of
scheduling, often ignored Staub’s requests for time off, calling his
military duties “bullshit.” 266 On one occasion, Mulally issued Staub a
written warning for allegedly disobeying instructions. 267 A few months
later, a coworker complained that Staub was often unavailable. 268
Later, Staub’s supervisor was unable to locate him, in violation of
Mulally’s instruction to notify her of his location. 269 After this episode,
Linda Buck, the vice president of human resources, terminated
Staub. 270 Buck stated that without the three prior incidents—Mulally’s
warning, the coworker’s complaint and Staub’s “disappearance”—she
would not have fired Staub. 271
Staub invoked the cat’s paw theory to impute Mulally’s animus to
Buck. 272 Staub contended that Mulally fed false information to Buck
because of her discriminatory bias and that Buck relied on this
information in deciding to terminate Staub. 273 Staub convinced a jury
of this theory and obtained a verdict in his favor.274 On appeal,
however, the Seventh Circuit reversed the jury verdict because of
insufficient evidence. 275 The court applied the same rule as it did in
Brewer, namely, whether the biased employee exercised singular
influence over the official decisionmaker. 276 Unless the ultimate
decisionmaker held that title only nominally, liability will not exist. 277
Again, drawing from the underlying analogy, the Seventh Circuit
265

Id. at 651.
Id. at 651–52.
267
Id. at 653.
268
Id.
269
Id. at 654.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 655.
273
Id. at 655.
274
Id.
275
Id. at 657.
276
Id. at 656.
277
Id.
266
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stated “true to the fable, [a cat’s paw case] requires a blind reliance,
the stuff of ‘singular influence.’ ” 278 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s
precedent demonstrates how courts have struggled with the proper
application of the cat’s paw doctrine over the past twenty years.
IV. THE APPROPRIATE REACH OF CAT’S PAW LIABILITY
The circuits’ varying standards apparently results from just how
literally courts interpret the cat’s paw analogy. On the one hand, courts
applying the influence standard hardly focus on the analogy, using it as
a guidepost at most. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit has taken
the metaphor quite literally in “deriving its total-control-over-theactual-decision standard.” 279 The Tenth Circuit expressly disagrees
with an approach that limits liability to cases closely resembling the
cat’s paw. 280 Rather, the Tenth Circuit described its view of the
analogy by stating, “[s]tripped of their metaphors, subordinate bias
claims simply recognize that many companies separate the
decisonmaking function from the investigation and reporting
functions, and that racial bias can taint any of those functions.” 281 And
in Staub, the Seventh Circuit limited liability to cases that are “true to
the fable.” 282
Ultimately, a comparison of each circuit’s unique approach is
more than a semantic exercise. 283 The particular standard can affect
the outcome of the case, whether it is resolved at the summary
judgment level or proceeds to trial. 284 Thus, without a uniform
standard, “similarly situated parties receive different treatment
278

Id. at 659 (quoting Brewer v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908,
917 (7th Cir. 2007).
279
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th Cir.
2006).
280
Id.
281
Id.
282
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009).
283
Thomas, supra note 33, at 655.
284
Id.
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depending on where they bring their cases.” 285 Courts need to adopt a
coherent and uniform standard for deciding these common cases. In
doing so, this section offers three suggestions. First, courts should use
a motivating factor standard of causation in determining liability rather
than focusing on vague formulations of influence. Second, courts need
to scrutinize whether an independent investigation truly breaks the
causal connection. Third, courts should apply agency principles to
limit the imposition of vicarious liability in this context.
A. Courts Should Adopt the Standard of Motivating Factor Causation
to Determine the Requisite Level of Control that a Biased Employee
Must Exercise in Order to Impose Liability
The element of causation constitutes one of the central issues in
delineating the appropriate reach of cat’s paw liability. 286 As in any
other disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff in a cat’s paw case must
demonstrate a causal connection between the prohibited characteristic
and the challenged action. 287 Although the current circuit split focuses
on the requisite degree of influence that the biased employee must
exercise, the courts’ various formulations, as a practical matter, relate
to the standard of causation that the courts are seeking to impose. 288
Specifically, the lenient influence approach requires only a minimal
level of causation, while the strict actual decisionmaker and singular
influence standards require a much higher level of causation. Even the
courts that claim to use a causation-based approach do not define
causation nor indicate what causation standard they require. However,
the lack of a unified causation standard in cat’s paw cases should come
as no surprise because, as discussed in Section I.A, employment
discrimination law, on the whole, suffers from the same deficiency. 289
285

Eber, supra note 13, at 187.
White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 511.
287
Id.
288
Thomas, supra note 33, at 659.
289
Katz I, supra note 36, at 491–93. Attempting to make sense of the causation
doctrine, Professor Katz has categorized the six most prominent formulations as
286
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To resolve the ambiguity, courts should adopt the motivating
factor causation standard to determine when employers should be held
liable for several reasons. First, the statutory language of Title VII
explicitly calls for a motivating factor test. 290 Congress amended Title
VII so that instead of requiring that the adverse employment action
was taken “because of” a prohibited characteristic, now the prohibited
characteristic need only be a “motivating factor.” 291 Prior to the 1991
amendment, the “because of” language had been interpreted to require
but-for causation. 292 The tort concept of but-for causation means that a
factor is considered necessary to an event if, but for its existence, the
event would not have taken place when it did. 293 The Supreme Court’s
opinion in Price Waterhouse, which triggered the 1991 Amendments,
discussed the problems with requiring plaintiffs to prove but-for
causation, especially in disparate treatment cases. 294 As a result,
scholars agree that the change to the motivating factor test
demonstrates Congress’ intent to remove the standard of but-for
causation. 295 Therefore, the strict principally responsible and singular
influence standards of causation contradict the statutory language of
Title VII and correspondingly Congress’ intent. By requiring that the

follows: (1) the “motivating factor” test from the 1991 Act and Price Waterhouse;
(2) the “same action” formulation also from the 1991 Act; (3) the “but for” test; (4)
the “determinative influence” or “determinative factor” formulation; (5) the “a role,”
“a cause,” and “a factor” test; and (6) the “substantial factor” test. Id. at 500–01.
290
See Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 402.
291
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Leigh A. Van Ostrand, A Close Look at ADEA
Mixed-Motives Claims and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 399, 417–18 (2009).
292
See White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 505.
293
Katz I, supra note 36, at 496, 501.
294
Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J.
643, 655–58 (2008) [hereinafter Katz II] (discussing how plaintiffs have problems
getting access to the evidence that is necessary to prove but for causation because it
is under the control of the defendant, that is, it is “often in the head of the decisionmaker”).
295
Katz I, supra note 36, at 505–06.
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biased subordinate serve as the “actual decisionmaker,” the strict
causation standards requires, at a minimum, but-for causation. 296
In place of but-for causation, Title VII now requires that the
prohibited characteristic be a “motivating factor” in the decision. 297
Congress definitely enacted the motivating factor test to require a less
onerous causation standard that but-for causation. 298 Although the
motivating factor language does not constitute a traditional causation
concept, legislative history suggests that it most likely refers to the tort
standard of minimal causation. 299 Minimal causation exists when a
factor does not rise to the level of necessity, but does have some causal
influence on the event in question. 300
However, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gross
v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the motivating factor standard
apparently only applies in Title VII cat’s paw cases. 301 Yet strong
arguments exist that the same standard should be used in relation to all
of the antidiscrimination statutes that use the “because of”
language. 302 As Justice Stevens noted in his Gross dissent, Price
Waterhouse interpreted the “because of” language as requiring the
motivating factor test and not but-for causation. 303 Additionally, the
Supreme Court has historically applied Title VII precedent to ADEA
296

Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 402.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
298
See Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2357 (2009)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that Price Waterhouse repudiated the but-for
standard twenty years ago and Congress’ response also demonstrates that but-for
causation is not necessary); Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 402–03.
299
Katz I, supra note 36, at 505–06.
300
Id. at 498–99.
301
129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
302
See Katz II, supra note 294, at 667–73 (outlining numerous reasons why the
motivating factor interpretation of “because of” should be applied to
antidiscrimination statutes other than Title VII, such as an assumption of uniformity,
the uniform-meaning canon of statutory construction, express statement of
congressional intent and the historical context of the 1991 Amendment).
303
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (stating, “[t]o
construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for’ causation is to
misunderstand them”).
297
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cases. 304 And with respect to cat’s paw cases specifically, courts have
consistently assumed that the same legal standard applies to all of the
antidiscrimination statutes. 305 Unfortunately, the current fragmented
treatment of antidiscrimination statutes creates additional problems in
attempting to create a unified standard for the cat’s paw doctrine.
Nonetheless, the best solution should still focus on causation.
In addition to statutory language, antidiscrimination legislation’s
underlying goals support motivating factor causation. Congress
enacted antidiscrimination statutes to deter discrimination and to
provide remedies to discrimination victims. 306 The stringent actual
decisionmaker and singular influence standards counter the statutes’
deterrent purpose. Knowing they can escape liability so long as the
biased employee did not completely control the decision, employers
have little incentive to proactively eliminate discrimination in their
workplaces. 307 In fact, the strict rules may encourage employers to
design policies of “willful blindness” where the decisionmaking
process “intentionally mask[s] the underlying discriminatory motive as
a basis to avoid liability.” 308 At the same time, overly lenient standards
may not further the deterrent goal either. If employers can be liable
based on an insignificant amount of biased influence, they may believe
that preventative measures are simply fruitless. 309 A causation-based
standard forges a middle ground that encourages employers to
implement policies that prevent, not cover up, discrimination.

304

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); see also
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (applying
Title VII principles to ADEA case).
305
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647
(7th Cir. 2009) (No. 09-400), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2009/11/09-400_pet1.pdf.
306
Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 403.
307
Keaton Wong, Comment, Weighing Influence: Employment Discrimination
and the Theory of Subordinate Bias Liability, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1729, 1753–54
(2008).
308
Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 404.
309
Eber, supra note 13, at 177–78.
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A causation-based approach also advances the remedial purpose
of antidiscrimination. A less onerous standard, like motivating factor
causation, makes it easier for plaintiffs to defeat summary judgment
and allow a jury to decide whether the discriminatory conduct caused
the employment decision. 310 Permitting greater access to a jury is
important because federal antidiscrimination statutes are remedial in
nature and, as such, should be broadly construed to fulfill their
purposes. 311 Strict standards of causation, like those of the Fourth and
Seventh Circuit, ignore the remedial purpose of antidiscrimination
statutes by imposing such a high hurdle. 312 The actual decisionmaker
and singular influence rules effectively remove an entire category of
plaintiffs from the protections of antidiscrimination legislation. 313
Moreover, a causation-based standard properly maintains the
element of causation. Despite the ambiguities about the standard of
causation, there is no doubt that the antidiscrimination statutes require
a causal connection between the unlawful bias and the challenged
decision. 314 The lenient approach may inappropriately remove the
causation requirement. 315 Courts may impose liability based on a
trivial amount of influence or involvement and presume that causation
exists. Thus, the lenient standard’s failure to address the element of
causation constitutes a significant flaw. A motivating factor standard,
however, does not eliminate a requirement of causation. Minimal
causation still requires that the discriminatory intent have a causal
influence on the adverse employment action, but it does not require
that the intent rise to the level of “but for” causation.

310

Id. at 175.
Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 403.
312
Id.
313
Kaler, supra note 2, at 1087.
314
White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 503–05.
315
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 486–87 (10th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998) as
construing Title VII “to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for
harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority” (emphasis in original)).
311
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Finally, courts can uniformly understand and apply traditional tort
principles of causation. 316 Courts have struggled in applying the vague
standards enunciated by many of the circuit courts. The blurred
boundaries between whether a biased employee was the “actual
decisionmaker,” the one “principally responsible,” exercised “singular
influence,” or “provided input” causes illogical results.317 Instead of
assessing ambiguous terminology, courts should explicitly evaluate the
element of causation. Tort causation principles are “well-defined and
widely understood by courts.” 318 Thus, in contrast to the influence
and actual decisionmaker approaches, the causation-based standard
certainly focuses on the appropriate issue. But because several
different causation standards exist in employment discrimination law,
courts need to clarify what standard of causation they require. In doing
so, courts should adopt the motivating factor standard because it
comes straight from the language of Title VII, maintains an element of
causation and provides a uniform formulation that courts can readily
apply. In sum, motivating factor causation offers the best solution to
the circuit split over the level of control that the biased employee must
exercise over the actual decisionmaker.
B. “Independent” Investigations: When Should They Be Permitted to
Break the Causal Connection?
Closely related to the standard of causation, the independent
investigation defense constitutes another important issue in the cat’s
paw context. An independent investigation “serves to replace the
influence of a subordinate’s bias with the untainted determination of
an unbiased ultimate decisionmaker.” 319 By investigating the
circumstances relevant to the decision, the official decisionmaker can
remove the taint of discrimination brought in by the biased employee’s

316

Eber, supra note 13, at 184.
See id.
318
Id.
319
Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 413–14.
317
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actions and thereby break the chain of causation. 320 Nearly all of the
circuit courts allow an employer to escape liability by conducting an
independent investigation. 321 Yet despite this general agreement, the
circuits are again divided about the meaning of “independent
investigation.” 322
More precisely, the courts disagree about the type of investigation
that employers must conduct to remove the taint of discrimination. 323
For example, the Tenth Circuit in BCI stated that merely asking the
affected employee for his side of the story suffices. 324 The Seventh
Circuit in Brewer stated that “[i]t does not matter that, in a particular
situation, much of the information has come from a potentially biased
source, so long as the decision maker does not . . . limit her
investigation to information from the biased source.”325 The Seventh
Circuit also suggested that the affected employee had a duty to inform
the official decisionmaker of any additional facts that would warrant
further investigation. 326 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that an
320

Id. at 412.
See, e.g., Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007); EEOC v.
BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th Cir. 2006); Cariglia v.
Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 363 F.3d 77, 87 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004); Willis v. Marion
County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1997); Long v. Eastfield Coll.,
88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996).
322
Ratliff, supra note 22, at 269.
323
Id.
324
BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 488. The First and Eleventh Circuits have
adopted a similar view. Cariglia v. Hertz Equipment Rental Corp., 363 F.3d 77, 87
n.4 (1st Cir. 2004 ) (stating that its decision to remand the case for additional
findings may have been different if the plaintiff had been given an opportunity to
address the allegations against him); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d
1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that an employer should be absolved from
liability when “the employer makes an effort to determine the employee’s side of the
story”).
325
479 F.3d at 918.
326
479 F.3d 919; see also Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354
F.3d 277, 293–94 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (noting that the employee failed to
dispute any of her biased supervisor’s negative evaluations and that “it was
incumbent upon her to dispute any basis for the reprimand at that time if she
intended to complain later”); but see Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dept.,
321
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investigation does not necessarily sever the causal link between the
alleged bias and the decision. 327 Instead, the Fifth Circuit allows the
jury to determine whether the ultimate decision was based on the
employer’s independent investigation. 328 As an example of a clearly
sufficient effort, the investigation in Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa
consisted of a three-day hearing where the employee was permitted to
present evidence and witnesses on his behalf. 329 Courts have given
less attention to steps that do not constitute an independent
investigation. But the Tenth Circuit did find a basic review of the
affected employee’s personnel file unsatisfactory. 330
The uncertainty relating to independent investigations burdens all
types of employers. 331 Employers increasingly vest decisionmaking
authority in lower-level employees and allow those employees to base
their decisions on information provided by subordinates. 332 With the
varying standards for cat’s paw liability, employers are unsure how to
tailor their decisionmaking structure so as to avoid liability. 333 In
particular, large employers with centralized personnel departments
need help designing procedures that expose potential bias. 334 And
smaller employers with fewer resources also need to know “how much
time and money must be put into an investigation.” 335

549 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding employer liable even though the employee
failed to raise his supervisor’s racial bias during an investigation conducted by a
subordinate manager).
327
Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 346–47 (5th Cir. 2002).
328
Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Kramer
v. Logan Sch. Dist. No. R-1, 157 F.3d 620, 622–24 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
issue of whether the school board rubber stamped a recommendation for nonrenewal was “appropriately presented to the jury”).
329
Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).
330
450 F.3d, 476, 492–93 (10th Cir. 2006).
331
Santoro, supra note 37, at 835.
332
Eber, supra note 13, at 188.
333
Id.
334
Santoro, supra note 37, at 835.
335
Id.
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Although the independent investigation doctrine may be
theoretically sound, several problems exist with the defense in its
current state. First, many circuits allow too low of a level of
investigation to break the causal connection. By characterizing the
mere act of asking employees for their version of the events as an
independent investigation, courts too quickly assume that this action
will remove the discriminatory taint. The Seventh Circuit in Brewer
stated that an independent investigation contains “some affirmative act
by the decision maker to come to his own decision.” 336 Yet the court
held that the decisionmaker’s simple action of looking at the altered
parking sticker, which served as the impetus for the employee’s
termination, constituted such an affirmative action. 337
Courts should be wary in concluding that such cursory actions
constitute an independent investigation. Because the defense
fundamentally relates to causation, it is vital that courts examine
whether the investigation truly breaks the connection between the
employee’s bias and the ultimate decision. 338 Thus, courts should not
blindly consider any perfunctory employer action an independent
investigation, but, instead, should more carefully scrutinize the
employer’s steps. In its merits brief to the Supreme Court, the EEOC
suggested that the “more thorough, balanced, and truly independent
the investigation, the more likely the termination will be the result of
the investigation rather than the discriminatory input.” 339
In addition to the low threshold of what satisfies the defense,
another problem relates to whether an investigation can ever truly be
independent in the cat’s paw context. The circuit courts have assumed
that an impartial inquiry is possible and have ignored the role of
expectancy confirmation bias. 340 Expectancy confirmation bias, a
336

Brewer v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id.
338
Eber, supra note 13, at 194–95.
339
Brief of Respondent at 35, EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A.,
450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006) (No. 06–341), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007).
340
Recent Cases, Employment Law -- Title VII -- Tenth Circuit Clarifies
Causation Standard for Subordinate Bias Claims, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1699, 1703
(2007).
337
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social psychology concept, teaches that after a recommendation has
been made, the recommendation will serve as a prior theory or a
tentative hypothesis. 341 More specifically, a biased employee’s
recommendation “can reasonably be expected to influence the ultimate
decision maker’s judgment in a recommendation-consistent direction,
even if he conducts his own investigation.” 342
Expectancies also affect the amount and type of information that
individuals seek before making a final decision. 343 Because the
decisionmaker may be anchored to a presumption of guilt, the
decisionmaker may investigate the underlying events in a way that
uncovers only expectation-confirming evidence.344 Further,
decisionmakers may ask asymmetric questions that allow confirmation
of their hypotheses. 345 Not only does expectancy confirmation bias
influence the investigation, but it also affects how individuals process
information once uncovered. The decisionmaker will likely consider
theory-confirming evidence more probative than any theorydisconfirming evidence. 346 Social science research demonstrates that
the decisionmaker may “remember the strengths of confirming
evidence but the weaknesses of disconfirming evidence . . . [and]
accept confirming evidence at face value while scrutinizing
disconfirming evidence hypercritically.” 347 Individuals also process
expectancy-confirming information more easily. 348

341

White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 524. For a detailed description of the
classic studies illustrating the expectancy confirmation bias, see id. at 525.
342
Id. at 524.
343
Recent Cases, supra note 340, at 1704.
344
Id.
345
Id.
346
White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 525–26.
347
Recent Cases, supra note 340, at 1704–05 (quoting Charles G. Lord et. al.,
Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on
Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098,
2099 (1979) (determining “that individuals with strong preconceived opinions
examine evidence in a biased manner”)).
348
Id. at 1704.
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Indeed, the effects of expectancy confirmation bias are strongest
in a situation like a cat’s paw case. 349 The decisionmaker may give
“excessive deference” to the biased subordinate’s story and less credit
to the employee’s account because of the supervisor’s higher position
in the workplace hierarchy. 350 Further, individuals holding positions of
power are more likely to be affected by expectancy confirmation
bias. 351 Because of high demands on their cognitive resources and the
lack of any direct negative consequences, superiors are prone to use
the hypothesis as a “convenient heuristic” and to conduct
investigations in an expectancy-confirming way. 352 Research also
demonstrates that expectancy confirmation bias tends to materialize
more often in situations dealing with ambiguous or complex evidence,
which is common in employment decisions. 353
Consequently, the notion that an investigation can always remove
the taint of bias is inherently flawed. The independent investigation
defense, as it currently stands, does nothing to account for this
possibility. 354 To counteract the effects of expectancy confirmation
bias, the decisionmaker should inquire into the relevant supervisor’s
background and motives whenever an employment action is taken
against a member of a protected class. 355 For example, the ultimate
decisionmaker could interview the supervisor’s colleagues and
examine the supervisor’s file for potential complaints of biased
behavior. 356 The decisionmaker could study the supervisor’s reports
349

White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 526.
Recent Cases, supra note 340, at 1703–04.
351
Id. at 1705.
352
Id.
353
Id. Research also suggests that the effects of expectancy confirmation bias
will be magnified where “the deficiencies or transgressions grounding the
supervisor’s report or recommendation are consistent with a stereotype associated
with the target employee’s social group.” White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 524–25.
354
For an argument that the independent investigation issue should be
considered a question of fact and judges should not be permitted to grant summary
judgment based on the defense, see Ratliff, supra note 22, at 274–77.
355
Recent Cases, supra note 340, at 1706.
356
Id.
350
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and recommendations regarding other employees to check for any
pattern of bias. 357 Professors White and Krieger suggest that
[s]uch an affirmative process would require, among other things,
explicitly considering the possibility that bias had influenced the
process at its earlier stages, assuring that all available allegation or
recommendation-inconsistent facts have been energetically
developed and their potential implications thoroughly explored,
and subjecting all recommendation-consistent information to
rigorous critical scrutiny. 358
If necessary, an employer could hire an independent outside consultant
to conduct the investigation, although this option might be costly. 359
Ultimately, the decisionmaker should “explicitly consider[] the
possibility that bias had influenced the process at its earlier stages” to
eliminate any discriminatory effects. 360
However, a rigid rule detailing mandatory steps would ignore the
fact-intensive nature of cat’s paw claims. 361 An independent
investigation standard also must recognize that employers need to be
able to rely on information from subordinate employees. 362 Employers
should be able to maintain flexibility in conducting these inquiries,

357

Id.
White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 527.
359
Santoro, supra note 37, at 840. An outside consultant provides the benefit
of being more experienced in conducting these types of employment investigations,
interviewing employees and reviewing evidence. Additionally, an outside consultant
may be more likely than an inside party to assess the situation from an impartial
perspective. On the other hand, an outside consultant may be less familiar with the
particular workplace’s culture, organizational structure and the parties involved in
the employment decision. Id.
360
White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 527.
361
Eber, supra note 13, at 194.
362
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that
any independent investigation standard must account for the realities of the
workplace).
358

153
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss1/5

46

Kepner: True to the Fable?: Examining the Appropriate Reach of Cat's Paw

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 1

Fall 2009

especially in light of the potential time and costs. 363 A more thorough
investigation does not need to be an onerous or lengthy task. 364
Certainly not every situation would call for a three-day evidentiary
hearing, as was conducted in Stimpson. 365 In sum, courts should
permit employers to prevent liability by conducting independent
investigations. But courts must hold employers to a more meaningful
standard in assessing whether the investigation sufficiently broke the
causal link. 366
C. Proper Consideration of Agency Principles Serves to Limit
Employer Liability Under the Cat’s Paw Doctrine
Even after establishing a causal link between a prohibited
characteristic and the challenged decision, the plaintiff must still
demonstrate that the disparate treatment can be attributed to the
employer. 367 Such an inquiry relates to the underlying agency
principles that simultaneously give rise to cat’s paw liability and serve
to limit its application. A proper application of vicarious liability
“eases concerns that causation analysis imposes liability for
discrimination on a too attenuated basis.” 368 As discussed in Section
I.A, Congress’ use of the term agent in defining employer “evince[d]
an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which
employers . . . are to be held responsible.” 369 The question becomes,
therefore, which employees can cause liability under the cat’s paw
doctrine. 370

363

Recent Cases, supra note 340, at 1706.
Id.
365
186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).
366
Eber, supra note 13, at 195.
367
White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 517.
368
Id. at 522.
369
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
370
Ernest F. Lidge, III, The Male Employee Disciplined for Sexual Harassment
as Sex Discrimination Plaintiff, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 717, 747 (2000).
364
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As can be assumed by this point, the circuit courts have given the
agency issue varying degrees of attention. Many of the courts utilizing
the lenient standard essentially ignore the issue of agency. One
commentator noted that because those courts failed to overtly discuss
the agency issue, “it is not clear whether these courts view the agency
link as established by virtue of the actions of the biased subordinate or
by virtue of the actions of the ultimate decisionmaker.” 371 The Fourth
Circuit based its actual decisionmaker rule, in large part, on agency
principles. 372 The Fourth Circuit limits liability to those employees to
whom the employer delegated supervisory authority.373 In contrast, the
Tenth Circuit requires the biased employee to misuse some form of
delegated authority. 374 The court did not limit such authority to only
supervisory abilities, but held that the “authority to monitor
performance, report disciplinary infractions, and recommend
employment actions” also sufficed. 375
The Tenth Circuit’s approach provides the most balanced answer
to the agency question in cat’s paw cases. By disregarding the agency
limitation, the lenient courts improperly open the door to automatic
liability for all employees’ actions. Instead, courts should apply
agency principles because they properly cabin the situations that can
expose the employer to cat’s paw liability. The agency limitation
relates to the deterrent objective of antidiscrimination legislation. In
other words, employers should be held liable for the “discriminatory
act of employees that it reasonably may have prevented.” 376
Employers have a better opportunity to prevent and monitor
misconduct by employees possessing delegated authority than by

371

Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 408.
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 287 (4th Cir.
2004) (en banc).
373
Id. at 288–91.
374
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 487 (10th Cir.
2006).
375
Id. at 485.
376
Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 410.
372
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ordinary workers. 377 For example, an employer should not be held
vicariously liable if a biased customer or independent contractor filed
a false report of employee misconduct that caused the employee to be
terminated. 378 Nor would an employer be liable for an ordinary
employee, lacking any delegated authority, falsely reports another
employee’s misconduct. 379
On the other hand, Supreme Court precedent and policy concerns
suggest that vicarious liability should not be limited to only formal
supervisors. In Ellerth, the Supreme Court concluded that vicarious
liability exists when a supervisor effectuates a tangible employment
action against a subordinate. 380 Importantly, however, the Ellerth
Court did not limit liability to only this context. 381 Instead, the Court
remarked that other circumstances implicating employer liability
based on the agency relationship were “less obvious.” 382 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Ellerth “ultimately stands for the proposition that
an employer may be liable for agency purposes when an employee
misuses delegated authority that results in an adverse employment
action.” 383 Consequently, courts have properly determined that cat’s
paw liability, as a specific branch of vicarious liability, exists when the
biased subordinate who causes the adverse employment action is a
supervisor.
Yet, just as Ellerth explicitly noted, this scenario does not
represent the outer bounds of vicarious liability, and liability may be
appropriate in other contexts. Employers should also be liable for

377

Brief of Respondent at 23, EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A.,
450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006) (No. 06–341), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007).
378
Id. at 22–23.
379
See White & Krieger, supra note 7, at 519–20 (describing scenario where
single discriminatory act by an ordinary employee would not give rise to liability
because “no action properly attributable to the employer was the product of an intent
to discriminate”).
380
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998).
381
Id. at 762–63.
382
Id. at 763.
383
Befort & Olig, supra note 8, at 412.
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employee misuse of different types of delegated authority. 384 For
example, an employee lacking formal supervisory ability may still be
able to make recommendations on issues such as promotion, discipline
or termination. 385 In fact, the increasing prevalence of peer evaluations
suggests that biased coworkers may have just as much power as
formal supervisors. 386 The biased employee may not hold the title of
supervisor, but employer liability would still be proper “if the
recommender’s misuse of that lesser form of delegated authority
serves as a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.” 387 In
applying agency principles, courts should not be overly formalistic in
focusing only on whether the employee was vested with the
appropriate title. Thus, the Fourth’s Circuit’s rigid limitation of
liability to only actual decisionmakers misinterprets agency principles.
Consistent with the Tenth Circuit, courts should focus on employees
with any delegated ability to inflict harm on other employees, instead
of being unduly limited to only named supervisors.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, cat’s paw liability constitutes an important facet of
employment discrimination law because it accounts for the changing
structure of workplace personnel departments. Yet, as a relatively new
legal theory, the cat’s paw doctrine contains several problematic issues
that need to be addressed. The current circuit split demonstrates the
difficulty courts have faced in applying the doctrine. Although the
cat’s paw issue is ripe for review by the Supreme Court, until that time
comes the circuit courts should attempt to adopt a uniform and sound
approach. In doing so, courts should utilize a motivating factor
standard of causation rather than focusing on vague notions of control,
influence or involvement. Additionally, courts should more carefully
scrutinize whether an employer’s actions sufficiently break the causal
384

Id. at 411.
Id.
386
See Kaler, supra note 2, at 1090.
387
Id. at 412.
385
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connection so as to be considered an independent investigation.
Finally, even after finding causation satisfied, courts should apply
agency principles to determine if the employer can be held vicariously
liable for the employee’s actions. By implementing these suggestions,
courts will do justice to the cat’s paw metaphor.
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